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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Student loan debt has received plenty of attention over the past several years from the media, scholars
and policymakers. Increased scrutiny on aggregate and individual debt, especially for graduate and
professional students, has led some to question the efficacy and value of some federal loans, arguing
the private sector is better equipped to handle providing access to advanced education.
But the value of federal loans is unmistakably clear: they provide access to education to those who
would otherwise not be able to afford it. This goal of expanding access to advanced education, which
is of no import to private lenders, is critical to maintaining America’s high educational and economic
standing. Having formerly been one of the largest private student loan lenders in the country, and given
our focus on graduate and professional education, we show in this report that the private sector would
be an inadequate substitute for the current federal investment in higher education, especially regarding
maintaining access to advanced education for all students.
As Congress deliberates the value of advanced education through reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act, it is critical that it is armed with complete and accurate context, data and potential
effects of proposed policy changes. Proposals designed to have the federal government retreat from
providing loans to those seeking graduate and professional degrees are misguided at best, and if
implemented, would substantially hinder access to advanced education for those who need it most.
This report, the second of our two-part series on graduate lending, uses federal data to show, as one
example, that black borrowers and Historically Black Colleges and Universities would likely be severely
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harmed by a move to significantly limit or outright eliminate federal lending to graduate and professional
students.
Key takeaways:
•

Changes to programs that would negatively impact and target graduate and professional students
(e.g., further limiting or eliminating Grad PLUS, increasing repayment amounts or time to forgiveness,
etc.) would be ill-advised because these students are, by far, the best performing cohort of borrowers
in the federal student loan portfolio.

•

Private student loan lending is an inadequate substitute for the access-driven investment from the
federal government in advanced education. Differing incentives, goals and underwriting means the
private sector would be unwilling to risk sacrificing profits to provide access for many students; thus, it
could not properly serve the diverse and broad demands of the American workforce.

•

Black borrowers and Historically Black Colleges and Universities would likely be the most substantially
harmed by privatization of graduate lending because of the difficulty many students would have
obtaining privately financed credit under traditional underwriting standards.

•

Addressing institutional quality and accountability cannot be intermingled with changes to federal
loans. Severely limiting or eliminating federal graduate lending should not be used as an end-run
around difficult-to-construct accountability systems because doing so would unnecessarily punish
students.
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1
PROVIDING ACCESS IS PARAMOUNT
Expanding access to all students, no matter their background, is the fundamental foundation of the
federal investment in higher education. Without this investment, we would live in a country where
only the privileged few would have access to the full range of educational opportunities available.
This would unnecessarily limit the expansion of the country’s intellectual capital, and it would
diminish the direct and compounding benefits less privileged students provide to the American
public. America is best served when everyone is given the chance to contribute to its advancement.
Congress, since it passed the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965, has committed to creating
financing programs for postsecondary students that are squarely focused on increasing access to
allow for a more educated American populace.1 The chief student-centered lever to expand access
is providing financial aid to students pursuing postsecondary education. At the graduate level, this is
achieved primarily through the Direct Unsubsidized Loan and the Direct PLUS (Grad PLUS) Loan.2
Federal funding of graduate study allows students, many of whom would otherwise be unable to
do so, to access advanced education, which more middle-class jobs now require.3 And while there
are certainly ways in which the federal loan programs could be improved, proposals that expect
the private sector to fill the financing void left by capping or eliminating federal loans to graduate
students must be weighed against the fundamental purpose of HEA: expanding access.
Failure to reform graduate lending without ensuring that access is maintained would result in
significant unintended consequences. Changes that neither align with program goals nor sufficiently
account for implementation effects will create problems that are more detrimental than the purported
problems the proffered changes were intended to cure. To mitigate such risks, policymakers must
keep proper perspective and consider relevant data when discussing policy changes to federal
graduate lending. This paper, the second of two, provides important context regarding private
student loan lending and illuminates the almost certain negative consequences of limiting federal
lending for graduate study.
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REPORT ROADMAP
This report supplements our previous analysis showing the principal criticisms of the Grad PLUS
loan—the impact of the loan’s terms and its potential cost—are unsupported by data or likely
exaggerated. 4 As policymakers continue to target graduate borrowers, we hope to highlight the
critical function that the federal role in graduate lending plays in ensuring access to advanced
education and how proposals to curtail or eliminate it have failed so far to fully explore the potential
severely negative consequences for students, institutions and America writ large.
This report seeks to provide necessary context around private graduate student lending and
explain how significantly paring back or ceasing graduate federal lending programs will likely
disproportionally prevent historically underrepresented populations from accessing advanced
education. To demonstrate the likely impact, we focus on federal lending data for black graduate
borrowers. The report also aims to move the discussion about graduate borrowing beyond the current
rhetoric so that policymakers and stakeholders have an accurate picture of the policy implications of
retreating from the federal investment in graduate education.
We begin by briefly discussing how the goal of private student lending is fundamentally different
from the government’s mission. We then explain how a return to the pre-Grad PLUS era is not
feasible. Following that, we illustrate how various underwriting criteria are or could be used in
private student lending to determine loan eligibility. Finally, using these underwriting criteria, we
focus on how minority students, specifically black graduate borrowers, would be unlikely to obtain
private student loans, thereby creating a significant access issue for them and the institutions they
attend.
We neither seek to shield federal lending programs or graduate borrowing from criticism nor
suggest there are no potential issues on the horizon. 5 Rather, we aim to shed light on the negative
consequences that would result from reducing the lending cap or eliminating federal graduate loans
altogether, specifically hindering access to graduate education, especially among black students.
The information presented here should help lawmakers evaluate current proposals around graduate
lending, and it can be used as a guide for potential reforms during reauthorization of HEA.
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A NOTE ABOUT ACCESSLEX INSTITUTE
As a nonprofit organization comprised of nearly 200 American Bar Association-approved nonprofit
and state-affiliated law schools, AccessLex Institute has been committed to improving access to and
maximizing the affordability and value of a law degree, and graduate and professional education
more broadly, since 1983.
For nearly 30 years, we provided and serviced private and federally backed student loans, with
an emphasis on lending to students engaged in graduate programs of study. After a change in
federal law in 2010, we ceased offering any new student loans, but we have continued our mission
to improve access, affordability and value through various initiatives including financial education,
research and grant-making.
At our lending peak, known at the time as Access Group ®, we were the seventh largest private
student loan lender – and the largest nonprofit student loan provider – in the country. The vast
knowledge and experience we gained in this field allow us to speak authoritatively about private
lending. Although potential lending decisions and underwriting criteria are different for each
financial institution, what we discuss below is based on decades of experience and a normalized set
of industry lending standards that suggests our analysis would fairly predict the outcome of a change
in graduate federal lending policies.
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2
GRADUATE BORROWING PARADOX
Over the past several years, much has been made about the cost of higher education and the
increase in student borrowing. The headline grabbing $1.6 trillion in outstanding student loans has
moved higher education debt from the policy world into mainstream consciousness.6 As a result,
politicians have introduced or championed policies like debt-free college, income share agreements
and institutional risk-sharing to constrain rising debt levels.
While many agree that some sort of policy prescription should be offered to address student debt,
there is no consensus that the amount of outstanding student debt is even a problem. 7 For those who
do believe it to be troublesome, there are many theories as to who or what may be driving increases
in student debt. However, some policymakers and academics believe they have identified the culprit
of higher education financing issues: graduate students.
This is a perplexing contention for several reasons. Among the myriad federal higher education
programs, very few are targeted specifically at graduate students, and those that exist are almost
always less fiscally beneficial to students than the undergraduate offerings. For example, the
federal loan exclusively for graduate students, Grad PLUS, has less favorable terms than federal
undergraduate loans. Specifically, graduate borrowers pay a higher interest rate on their loans, often
accounting for thousands of more dollars paid over the life of the loan than a borrower with only
undergraduate debt.8 Grad PLUS borrowers also have significantly higher federal loan origination
fees.9
Moreover, graduate borrowers are no longer eligible for Direct Subsidized Loans, meaning almost
all their federal graduate loans accrue interest while they are enrolled in school. Yet again, graduate
borrowers pay thousands more over the life of their federal loans, especially those enrolled in
longer programs like research doctoral or medical programs.10 Additionally, the terms of the most
recent income-driven repayment plan require graduate borrowers make qualifying payments for an
additional five years, compared to those with solely undergraduate debt, before they can receive
loan forgiveness.11
Despite all this, graduate borrowers are the best performing cohort in the federal student loan
portfolio.12 Even with higher average loan balances, higher interest rates, and higher fees than
undergraduates, graduate borrowers have the highest repayment rates and the lowest default rates
by a significant margin (Figure 1 and Table 1).13,14 Moreover, as of the first quarter of 2019, the total
outstanding loan volume of exclusively graduate debt, Grad PLUS, is $71.3 billion or just under 5
percent of the entire federal loan portfolio.15 These facts make it clear that graduate borrowers are
a critical asset to the federal government’s loan portfolio. While shouldering the most debt, having
the least favorable loan terms and repaying the most over time, graduate borrowers have been, are,
and remain the highest-performing group in the portfolio, especially relative to their undergraduate
and non-completing peers. It would be particularly misguided to target this group of borrowers for
additional programmatic cuts.
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Figure 1

FIVE-YEAR FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT RATES BY
INSTITUTION TYPE (1998-99 TO 2008-09)
50%
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35%
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10%

10%

5%
5%
0%
98-99
For-profit
Selective four-year

00-01

02-03

04-05

Public two-year
Most selective four-year

06-07

08-09

Non-selective four-year
Graduate-only borrowers

Note: Borrowers enter repayment in the stated year. Graduate-only borrowers are those who borrow only to attend
graduate school. Default rates are based on defaults occurring within five calendar years from the date of entering
repayment. Definition of selectivity taken from Barron’s Educational Series.16
Source: Authors’ modification of Trends in Student Aid 2018, Figure 2016_11B.

Nevertheless, the acute focus on graduate borrowing has led to calls and proposals to eliminate
the Grad PLUS loan or severely limit federal lending to graduate students.17 Some even suggest
removing the federal government entirely from the graduate lending marketplace.18 But how would
the hundreds of thousands of graduate students finance their graduate education in the absence of
federal support? The solution, some critics proffer, is to let the private sector take over completely.19
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Table 1

MEDIAN FEDERAL DEBT BALANCE AND FIVE-YEAR
DEFAULT RATE BY INSTITUTION TYPE (AY 2008-09)
MEDIAN DEBT

DEFAULT RATE

PUBLIC TWO-YEAR

$7,830

38%

FOR-PROFIT

$8,450

47%

NONSELECTIVE FOUR-YEAR

$14,650

27%

SELECTIVE FOUR-YEAR

$17,770

18%

MOST SELECTIVE FOUR-YEAR

$18,870

10%

GRADUATE-ONLY BORROWERS

$37,660

5%

Note: Dollars in 2013 dollars, adjusted for inflation. Graduate-only borrowers are those who borrow only to attend
graduate school. Default rates are based on defaults occurring within five calendar years from the date of entering
repayment.
Source: Authors’ reproduction of Trends in Student Aid 2018, Figure 2016_11B.

Black graduate borrowers would likely be
disproportionally harmed by privatizing graduate
lending. Implementing that policy change would
create a massive access issue for blacks who seek to
advance their careers though graduate education.
Suggesting that private student loans are an adequate replacement for federal student loans,
especially for graduate borrowers, seems to be premised on two main arguments.20 First, there was a
time before Grad PLUS when private loans played a role in funding graduate education, so we can
simply transition back to that time. Second, the private sector has competition and lending discipline,
and thus, the theory goes, privatization will result in some sort of market-based pressures being
applied on institutions to either improve outcomes or lower prices.
Unfortunately, advocates for privatizing all graduate student lending do not adequately wrestle with
how this policy might work in the present day. More specifically, proponents of a private student
lending takeover do not address the effects, especially unintentional ones, wholesale privatization of
graduate loans would have on institutions and certain populations.

12

For example, our analysis shows that black graduate borrowers would likely be disproportionally
harmed by privatizing graduate lending. Implementing that policy change would create a massive
access issue for blacks who seek to advance their careers though graduate education, thereby
exacerbating the already dismal diversity rates in professions preferring or requiring advanced
degrees.
This type of problem is exactly what the Higher Education Act was designed to prevent. Potential
access issues illustrate why it is critical for the federal investment in graduate education to remain
and why the private sector would be an inadequate substitute to try to level the playing field for
access to advanced education. The current federal lending programs seek to create equity in higher
education while staying true to HEA’s fundamental purpose of expanding access.
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3
DENIED!

PRIVATE MARKET AND LENDING DECISIONS
Policymakers seeking to eliminate federal lending to graduate students must ensure their assumptions
and arguments are sound and well-grounded. Before enacting a substantial change, those
advocating for a private lender takeover must understand the current market, how lending decisions
are made and how a change like this would impact access.
Below we briefly explore what makes today’s market unique, why the federal government and
private sector’s motivations are irreconcilably different and how lending decisions are or could be
made. All of these would materially affect lending decisions, and as a result, the makeup of graduate
school enrollment and the American economy.
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THEN VS. NOW (PRE- AND POST-GRAD PLUS)
The principal argument for eliminating federal investment in graduate education is that since private
lending previously played a dominant role, at least for a relatively short period, in how students
financed their graduate education, we can simply go back to that system without ill effects. But the
world has changed since that time. Turning to private lending as the primary way for graduate students
to pay for school is no longer a viable option because of the combination of increased education
costs and a tighter credit market. The combination of these factors means there is no “going back.” The
elimination of federal graduate lending would place advanced education funding in territory not seen
in several decades, when graduate school populations were wealthier and less diverse.
While private lending may have comprised an increasing portion of student financing leading up to
the introduction of Grad PLUS, historical lending data shows that private lending never enjoyed a
commanding share of the market (Figure 2).21 Even at its peak between 2006 and 2008, non-federal
loans accounted for only a quarter of student financing.22 More importantly, of that quarter, historical
lending analysis suggests that the overwhelming majority of private lending was for undergraduates,
and that the graduate lending that did occur accounted for a mere 9 to 12 percent.23
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Figure 2

TOTAL FEDERAL AND NON-FEDERAL LOANS BY LENDING
SOURCE (AY 1997-98 TO 2017-18)
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Note: Dollars in 2017 dollars, adjusted for inflation. Non-federal loans include loans to students from states and
institutions in addition to private loans issued by banks, credit unions and other lenders. Values for non-federal loans
are best estimates and are less precise than federal loan amounts.
Source: Authors’ modification of Trends in Student Aid 2018, Figure 6.

Examining graduate private lending specifically, in 2007-08 just 11 percent of graduate education
costs were financed by private loans (Figure 3).24 By academic year 2015-16, that number had
dropped to just 5 percent.25 In the same academic year, roughly 90 percent of graduate lending
was provided by the federal government (Figure 2). It would be a tall order for the private sector to
adequately serve all the borrowers that require financing.
Times have changed since the introduction of Grad PLUS in 2006, and the higher education
population of more than a decade ago simply does not reflect the current student body.26 And
because employers are demanding a more diverse workforce with a higher level of formal education,
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Figure 3

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATE STUDENTS WHO HAD
PRIVATE EDUCATION LOANS (AY 2004-05 TO 2015-16)
30%
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5%

2011-12
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5%

4%

5%

2015-16
Total

Note: Percentage of graduate students at for-profit schools who borrowed private education loans in AY 2004-05 is
authors’ calculation based on available data.
Source: National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016.

private student loan lenders would need to serve most, if not all, of the students who currently rely
on federal loans to maintain the current level of access to graduate education. However, advocates
of private lending have not explained how the private sector would be able to generate the capital
to support the private student loan risk attached to such an access-driven pool of borrowers. The
answer is that this capital would be unavailable and would cause irreparable disruption to advanced
education and the American workforce.
Another reason why private lending in the pre- and post-Grad PLUS eras is different is because
the cost of education has risen at the same time that credit has gotten tighter. In the first report in
this series, we demonstrated that tuition increases have not been the result of the availability of
Grad PLUS loan dollars.27 Rather, rises in tuition are the result of textbook economic factors like the
increase in demand for college education and increases in the costs of delivering a higher education
driven by labor and other expenses.
Thus, in terms of raw dollars, graduate school is simply more expensive today than it was in 200506 (Table 2). This means that more money must be lent to borrowers now, either by the federal
government or by private lenders, to finance graduate education. While this makes little difference
regarding loan approval in federal lending programs, private student loan lenders could certainly
use requested loan amounts to deny an applicant even though institutional costs are outside
applicants’ control.
Prior to the Great Recession, credit across all sectors was much more readily available than it is now.
In the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, lenders enforced much more demanding
17

Some may argue that prior to
Grad PLUS, there actually were
more private loans than data
shows because private lenders
participated in the Federal Family
Education Loan (FFEL) program.
They argue that even though
the loans were federally-backed,
they were made and serviced by
private lenders, and thus private
student loans likely accounted
for a significant percentage of
education loan disbursements.
Although private lenders played
a central role in FFEL loans, the
program’s terms made those
loans materially different from
a standard private student
loan. Because there was both
an interest rate subsidy and
a guarantee against default
from the federal government
that substantially reduced the
credit risk to a private lender for
nonperforming loans, FFEL loans
did not exhibit the type of marketbased signals and discipline that
policymakers and advocates seek
from a private sector takeover.
Thus, it is not appropriate to
look to the FFEL loan program
as indicative of private lender
behavior, then or now.28

lending standards and restricted the flow of credit
dramatically.29 This lasted for several years and
only recently has credit begun to loosen again.30
However, investors and lenders in some industries,
leery of repeating the mistakes of the past, still have
not returned to pre-Great Recession levels and may
never do so.31
These same trends were mirrored in the private
student loan space. According to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), from 2005 to
2007, underwriting standards loosened, and “during
this period, lenders were more likely to originate
loans to borrowers with lower credit scores than
they had previously been.”32 But after 2008, private
lenders enacted stricter lending policies requiring
more cosigners and “increased overall credit scores
within their portfolios by tightening credit standards
and reducing lending to nonprime borrowers.”33
The combined factors of private lenders never
having a commanding share of the student loan
market, increased cost of attendance and reduced
availability of credit make present-day lending a
unique time in higher education financing, for which
there is little precedent. Thus, it is erroneous to claim
that we can “go back” to a utopian era of private
student loan lending that arguably never existed.

INCENTIVE STRUCTURES
(ACCESS VS. PROFIT)
Lawmakers must also consider that on a more
fundamental level, the missions of the federal
government and private student lenders could not be
further apart. The purpose of the HEA is to expand
access to higher education to all students in America.
The various student aid programs that exist were
designed with the goal of ensuring that a student
who wants to advance his or her education can do
so without regard to background or circumstance.
Equity and access are at the heart of HEA lending
programs.
The goal of private student lenders is to make money
or, in the case of state-based and non-profit lenders,
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Table 2

AVERAGE TUITION AND FEES FOR FULL-TIME GRADUATE
STUDENTS (AY 2005-06 TO 2015-16)
PUBLIC
IN-STATE

PUBLIC
OUT-OF-STATE

PRIVATE
NONPROFIT

2005–06

$7,780

$18,370

$21,530

2007–08

$8,520

$19,090

$21,770

2009–10

$9,620

$20,790

$22,700

2011–12

$10,280

$21,240

$23,000

2013–14

$10,760

$22,020

$24,140

2015–16

$11,100

$22,590

$25,160

Note: Prices are weighted by full-time equivalent graduate enrollment. Figures are in constant dollars.
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 2005-15.

to make enough money to sustain themselves and continue working toward their organizational
missions. Leaders of for-profit companies have a legal fiduciary duty to their board, shareholders
and other investors to operate in a manner designed to provide a return on investment; therefore,
their lending policies will reflect that reality. Individual well-being, institutional diversity and other
societal goals are of little or no concern to most private lenders except to the extent such ideals
further the primary objective.
In contrast to the federal government, private lenders’ principal method of achieving their goal is to
limit access to their capital. Doing so lessens the risk of loss and increases profitability. Similarly, as
underwriting dictates, private lenders consider applicants’ backgrounds and circumstances because
those measures tend to have predictive value as to whether borrowers will repay their student loans.
These lending policies and effects are tailored toward private lenders’ core mission: to maximize the
value of the company.
Some argue the private sector’s capital-limiting framework could bring market discipline to the
federal loan portfolio.34 There is no doubt that the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal
programs could be enhanced by adopting some private lending best practices. But the fundamental
dichotomy would remain: HEA is designed to expand, not contract, access to advanced education.
To be clear, there is nothing wrong with making money. It is simply incongruent with the intended
purpose of federal lending in HEA. Advocating for replacing federal loans to graduate borrowers
with private loans does not reconcile the two entities’ distinct end goals, and, in fact, clearly
illuminates the differences. Failure to recognize the differences means the resulting unintended
consequences will be vast and severe.
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WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO REPAY
If policymakers are envisioning a significant role for private graduate lending, it is critical they
understand how lenders make lending decisions. Depending on the underwriting criteria used, it
becomes algorithmic to determine who receives a loan and who does not, the amount of the loan
and the associated terms. Lawmakers should examine underwriting criteria and focus on who is
unlikely to receive private loans to determine whether those results conflict with the HEA’s mission of
expanding access to higher education.
Student loans differ from most other consumer loans because, by definition, they are unsecured—
that is, there is usually no readily available collateral (students typically lack substantial assets and
lenders cannot repossess one’s education) and payments are not usually due until long after the loan
is made. Because of this, private student loans are inherently riskier than auto loans or credit cards.
As a result, underwriting criteria, typically focusing on one’s willingness and ability to repay, is likely
to be more stringent, especially for larger graduate loans.
Willingness to repay underwriting is focused solely on how a borrower has handled repaying their
financial obligations in the past. Although not exclusively, the primary tool to assess a borrower’s
willingness to repay a debt is to review a borrower’s or cosigner’s credit report and score. Examining

Lawmakers should examine underwriting criteria
and focus on who is unlikely to receive private loans
to determine whether those results conflict with
the HEA’s mission of expanding access to higher
education.
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borrowers’ past performance (e.g., on-time payments, credit balances, defaults, legal actions,
etc.) is fairly predictive of future repayment habits on new debt, thus lenders use this method often
because it is formulaic and efficient. This is the type of underwriting most consumers come to expect.
However, because student loans are different than other typical consumer loans, especially in edgecase lending decisions, lenders may require additional information to better judge loan eligibility.
In private student loan lending, there is additional value in determining a borrower’s ability to
repay. This differs from willingness to repay in that it assesses additional evidence to determine if
a borrower, even after having demonstrated positive repayment outcomes, will have the means to
repay a student loan. This supplemental information tends to focus on institutional or programmatic
outcomes (e.g., school reputation, graduation and job placement rates, etc.), the borrower’s
academic credentials or activities, or anything else that can help a lender determine if a borrower’s
future income will be enough to repay the student loan obligation on time and in full.
At its core, ability to repay is an assessment tool that tries to determine whether the combination
of the borrower and the program will deliver a positive return on the educational investment. This
is the market-based discipline that advocates of private student lending seek to introduce to the
federal lending portfolio. While this may make some sense on its face, it should be noted that private
lenders use this underwriting criterion, not because of charity or concern for the individual and the
quality of the institution, but rather as an important mechanism to determine whether the borrower
will repay the loan and the lender will make a profit. This, again, conflicts with the purpose of
federal investment in higher education: expanding access.
Evidence suggests that most private student loan lenders use willingness to repay underwriting
criteria to make lending decisions.35 In fact, some lenders have expressed concerns about utilizing
ability to repay metrics for fear of potentially violating discrimination laws.36 Still, it is important for
policymakers to understand that underwriting criteria can be whatever the lender chooses so long
as it does not run afoul of federal or state laws or regulations. Understandably, a lender will use
whatever underwriting standards the financial institution deems appropriate for the company to meet
its profitability pool and fiscal objectives. This makes perfect business sense but runs counter to the
goal of expanding access to advanced education.
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4
DENIED AGAIN!

THE EFFECT OF GRADUATE LENDING
PRIVATIZATION
Lenders will not lend to anyone who they believe will not repay a loan. While some defaults are
inevitable, lenders do complex analyses to ensure that their firms are profitable. Lenders will design
their lending criteria in a way that maximizes the quality of the approved applicant pool to meet
their fiscal goals. Applicants who do not meet the standard, regardless of future potential, will be
denied a loan. It’s that simple.
Because most private student lenders use willingness to repay underwriting to make lending
decisions, it is worth exploring who might be denied loans if federal graduate lending were to
be capped or eliminated. While each individual lending determination would be based on each
applicant’s unique situation, there is data that can tell us who might be most ripe for denial. Thus, we
examine two main factors in the willingness to repay criteria: how much do borrowers owe and what
are their repayment trends.

Black graduate students seeking to borrow and
institutions serving large minority populations would
likely be the most negatively impacted by the removal
of federal lending from the graduate space.
Black graduate students seeking to borrow and institutions serving large minority populations would likely
be the most negatively impacted by the removal of federal lending from the graduate space. Reviewing
federal loan data shows that other populations would be negatively affected as well by student loan
privatization; however, the evidence is clear that black students’ access to advanced education would be
the most severely hampered.

BLACK BORROWERS ARE MOST RIPE FOR LENDING DENIALS
Black students would likely be the most harmed by privatization of graduate student loans because they
typically carry the highest loan balances, and the limited data we have on repayment suggests they
struggle to repay their loans more than any other racial subpopulation. Using data from the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), we examined borrowing habits of graduate borrowers who
completed their program in academic year 2015-16 and found that black graduates rely the most on
federal student loans and tend to have the highest debt balances upon graduation.
22

Borrowing Trends
Compared to peers of other races, black graduate students are the most likely to borrow and rely on
federal student loans. In 2016, 80 percent of black graduates borrowed federal loans to fund their
graduate education (Table 3). The difference is just as stark when examining by race and degree
type—79 percent of black master’s graduates borrowed; 81 percent of black research doctoral
graduates borrowed; and 90 percent of black professional degree graduates borrowed federal
loans.

Table 3

PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO BORROWED FEDERAL
LOANS FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE AND DEGREE
(AY 2015-16)
BORROWED

DID NOT BORROW

White

57%

43%

Black

80%

20%

Hispanic/Latino

72%

28%

Asian

43%

57%

Total

60%

40%

White

54%

46%

Black

79%

21%

Hispanic/Latino

71%

29%

Asian

39%

61%

Total

58%

42%

White

54%

46%

Black

81%

19%

Hispanic/Latino

71%

29%

Asian

21%

79%

Total

57%

43%

White

75%

25%

Black

90%

10%

Hispanic/Latino

76%

24%

Asian

64%

36%

Total

75%

25%

All Degrees

Master’s

Research Doctoral

Professional

Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
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The reliance on federal loans has increased over time for black and Hispanic/Latino graduates.
From 2000 to 2016, the percentage of black and Hispanic/Latino graduates who borrowed federal
loans for graduate education grew considerably—black and Hispanic/Latino graduates increased
their reliance on federal loans by 12 and 23 percentage points, respectively (Figure 4). Even with
the significant jump in reliance on federal loans by Hispanic/Latino borrowers, black borrowers
still top them by 8 percentage points. Overall, black graduates borrowed an average cumulative
federal debt 17 percent higher than their white peers ($70,207 for black graduates and $59,997 for
white graduates), and their median debt was 33 percent higher ($51,250 for black graduates and
$38,473 for white graduates) (Table 4).
Black master’s graduates had borrowed, at the median, $15,000 more than white graduates and
on average graduated with $10,000 more in federal student loan debt. Similarly, black research
doctoral graduates borrowed on average over $30,000 more than their white peers, and black
median debt is nearly double that of white graduates ($113,054 for black graduates and $59,682
for white graduates) (Table 4).
The disparity between races in federal student loan debt taken for a professional degree is even
more pronounced. Black graduates who borrowed left school with a median debt level of over
$70,000 more in loans than their white peers ($207,205 for black graduates and $130,741 for white
graduates). On average, blacks had nearly $60,000 more in debt ($198,982 for black graduates

Figure 4

PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO BORROWED FEDERAL
LOANS FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE
(AY 2000 TO 2016)
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75%
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43%
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Black
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2004
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Source: National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) 2000 to 2016, TrendStats.
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Asian
2016

44%

and $140,603 for white graduates) (Table 4). Even accounting for higher debt due to higher tuition
in professional school, these disparities are striking.
The stark difference between black and white graduates’ debt levels is also apparent when
examining cumulative federal loan debt by degree program. For example, black Master of Business
Administration (MBA) graduates borrowed nearly $19,000 more on average than their white peers.
For a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree, blacks borrowed on average $37,000 more than their

Table 4

BORROWERS’ CUMULATIVE FEDERAL LOAN DEBT FOR
GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE AND DEGREE (AY 2015-16)
AVERAGE

MEDIAN

White

$59,997

$38,473

Black

$70,207

$51,250

Hispanic/Latino

$57,127

$41,000

Asian

$86,521

$56,868

Total

$63,025

$41,000

White

$40,217

$31,282

Black

$50,594

$46,632

Hispanic/Latino

$41,978

$37,532

Asian

$58,992

$48,280

Total

$43,304

$36,352

White

$73,131

$59,682

Black

$107,272

$113,054

Hispanic/Latino

$96,838

$65,897

Asian

‡

‡

Total

$82,654

$68,732

White

$140,603

$130,741

Black

$198,982

$207,205

Hispanic/Latino

$144,921

$167,408

Asian

$151,647

$123,707

Total

$148,722

$138,516

All Degrees

Master’s

Research Doctoral

Professional

Note: ‡ symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
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white peers, and for a Juris Doctor degree (J.D.), a staggering $98,000 more on average than their
white peers (Table 5).
Compared to peers of other races, black graduates generally borrowed the most, on average and
at the median, for master’s degrees at public and for-profit institutions. This holds true for research
doctoral degrees and professional degrees across all institutional sectors.37
Across institutional sectors, degree types and most degree programs, black graduates, compared
to graduates of all other races, represent the highest percentage of those who borrowed above the

Table 5

BORROWERS’ CUMULATIVE FEDERAL LOAN DEBT FOR
GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE AND PROGRAM
(AY 2015-16)
AVERAGE

MEDIAN

White

$36,598

$30,750

Black

$55,317

$44,574

Hispanic/Latino

$34,482

$31,020

Asian

‡

‡

Total

$44,141

$36,779

White

$77,925

$64,500

Black

$115,028

$123,972

Hispanic/Latino

$92,588

$74,745

Asian

‡

‡

Total

$85,507

$75,389

White

$100,510

$94,464

Black

$198,760

$206,700

Hispanic/Latino

$149,573

$167,408

Asian

‡

‡

Total

$120,406

$111,914

Master of Business Administration (MBA)

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Law (J.D.)

Note: ‡ symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
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Table 6

PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO HAD ABOVE AVERAGE
DEBT (AY 2015-16)
WHITE

BLACK

HISPANIC/
LATINO

ASIAN

Public

11%

23%

11%

18%

Private Nonprofit

21%

28%

25%

27%

Private For-profit

26%

33%

20%

12%

9%

19%

12%

13%

Research Doctoral

25%

63%

56%

9%

Professional

57%

74%

56%

52%

M.S.

7%

18%

9%

‡

M.A.

8%

17%

23%

‡

M.Ed.

4%

30%

9%

‡

MBA

6%

19%

5%

24%

Ph.D.

25%

71%

29%

16%

Ed.D.

21%

68%

‡

‡

J.D.

53%

88%

47%

‡

Institution Sector

Degree Type
Master’s

Degree Program

Note: The average cumulative federal loan debt for those who borrowed is approximately $63,000. Debt is cumulative
federal loan debt for graduate education. ‡ symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.

average federal debt level.38 For example, 71 percent of black Ph.D. graduates borrowed more than
$63,000 in federal student loans for graduate education, compared with only 25 percent of white
graduates (Table 6).
In the first paper in this series, we defined graduate borrowers with over $100,000 in cumulative
federal loan debt for graduate education as “high-debt borrowers.”39 When examining debt by both
degree type and program, black borrowers generally represent the highest percentages of high-debt
borrowers, when comparing by race. Stunningly, for research doctoral degrees, 51 percent of black
graduates were high-debt borrowers compared to just 15 percent of white graduates. An even more
striking disparity exists when comparing high-debt borrowing for law degrees (83 percent of black
graduates were high-debt borrowers compared to 31 percent of white graduates) (Table 7).
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Moreover, these borrowing trends at the graduate level match those at the undergraduate level,
where black undergraduates borrow more, and more often, to finance a bachelor’s degree than their
white peers—even at public institutions where tuition prices are the lowest. 40 This compounds the debt
burden for black graduates who then borrow more to attend graduate school.
This point is illustrated by research examining the total debt of black graduates, both undergraduate
and graduate, which noted that “[b]lack students were 130 percent more likely to have six-figure
debt burdens than white students.”41 In fact, for the 2015-16 academic year, an estimated “150,000
black borrowers had $100,000 in debt, more than half of the number of white borrowers with the
same debt level (250,000), despite white graduate student enrollment being four times [that of] black
grad student enrollment.”42 It is clear that black graduates would likely be requesting large loan
amounts from private lenders, which may decrease the likelihood of approval.

Table 7

PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO HAD “HIGH-DEBT”
(AY 2015-16)
WHITE

BLACK

HISPANIC/
LATINO

ASIAN

Public

7%

8%

4%

9%

Private Nonprofit

12%

15%

15%

21%

Private For-profit

14%

19%

8%

10%

Master’s

3%

6%

4%

6%

Research Doctoral

15%

51%

25%

2%

Professional

47%

59%

54%

42%

M.S.

2%

1%

4%

‡

M.A.

4%

6%

‡

‡

M.Ed.

1%

‡

‡

‡

MBA

1%

10%

‡

‡

Ph.D.

13%

56%

18%

‡

Ed.D.

15%

49%

‡

‡

J.D.

31%

83%

46%

‡

Institution Sector

Degree Type

Degree Program

Note: We define “high-debt” as having over $100,000 in cumulative federal loan debt for graduate education. ‡
symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.

28

Repayment Trends
Rates of repayment for graduate students generally appear high while default rates are as low as
5 percent. 43 Even analysts who are wary of high levels of graduate borrowing acknowledge that
graduate students’ rates of default are low. 44 However, to discern repayment and default rates
for students from all subpopulations, more publicly available disaggregated data on graduate
borrowers’ outcomes is needed.
Yet, there is likely cause for concern about repayment among black graduate borrowers. Research
at the undergraduate level shows that there are significant repayment disparities by race. Regarding
progress on debt in repayment for example, black college graduates, at the median, owed more
than their original principal loan balance 12 years after entering college—whereas white college
graduates at the median had repaid more than half of their original balance owed at that point in
time. 45
As for student loan default rates, black bachelor’s degree recipients were nearly four times more
likely to be in default than their white peers. 46 Of black borrowers in repayment on their student
loans in 2014, 19 percent were in default and another 33 percent were seriously delinquent on their
payments (90 days or more past due). 47 In fact, black bachelor’s degree recipients are more likely to
default than their white peers who did not even complete their undergraduate studies, which suggests
that completion alone does not accurately predict one’s ability to repay a student loan. 48
When examining these repayment trends, it is important to note that these repayment outcomes could
be caused by a host of factors, many of which would be beyond black borrowers’ individual control.
Some scholars have highlighted underlying factors like familial resources (e.g., the wealth gap
between races) and labor market outcome disparities to provide proper context for poor repayment
rates among black borrowers. 49 But private lenders make lending decisions based mostly on data
and would not take into account the reasons undergirding the data. If the undergraduate repayment
trend data is consistent at the graduate level, using an ability to repay underwriting criteria may
preclude large numbers of black graduate students from accessing the necessary capital to advance
their education and careers.
It is already clear that using traditional underwriting standards would disproportionally harm lowincome and minority borrowers. 50 This borrowing and repayment data, if used in either willingness
or ability to repay criteria, portends significant potential roadblocks for black graduate students
in obtaining private student loans for their graduate education. These combined factors make it
extremely likely that blacks will be disproportionally harmed by a move to private lending in the
graduate space.

Historically Black Colleges and Universities May Suffer
It is worth noting that while lending is done on an individual basis, many schools may also suffer
under a shift to private lending, either because not enough of the students they serve would be
approved or because lenders can opt not to lend to anyone attending the institution. Recall, ability to
repay underwriting essentially judges institutional quality, and a lender has neither an obligation nor
an interest in lending money that it believes it will not recoup.
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As noted above, there is little information about graduate repayment. However, recent analysis of
limited repayment data indicates that Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) would
likely be harmed by applying an ability to repay standard to their student borrowers. Of the top
20 graduate and professional schools with the highest share of borrowers who had not reduced
principal loan amounts five years after entering repayment, 12 (60 percent) of them were HBCUs. 51
While the median share of borrowers measured by the same metric at all graduate and professional
schools was 20 percent, HBCUs ranged as high as 65 percent of their borrowers down to 44 percent
of their borrowers having not paid down principal. 52 Even the lowest HBCU on the list was still 24
percent higher than the national average.
Although the study was not comprehensive, the repayment rates of those HBCU graduate programs
strongly suggest the ability to repay criteria would not be satisfied by many students attending those
institutions. Even the applicants who had the best willingness to repay track record and outstanding
academic performance would likely be denied if they attended certain institutions because lenders
would not be willing to bear the risk of large-scale defaults. One could envision entire categories of
schools, or at least institutions that serve large minority populations, closing because of insufficient
funding.

Lending Discrimination
Some may argue that widespread disenfranchisement of black borrowers is unlikely to occur because
there are state and federal discrimination laws barring such a practice. While those laws may stop
individual bad actors, they are unlikely to prevent an unintentional cumulative effect of dramatically
reducing the number of black graduate students who are able to obtain financing for their education.
Specifically, at the federal level, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits any lender from
engaging in intentional discrimination against enumerated protected classes (e.g., race, religion, sex,
age, etc.). 53 And while not statutorily defined, federal regulators have indicated that lending policies
that may have a “disparate impact” on protected classes could violate ECOA. 54
Disparate impact could be considered lending discrimination if “a lender applies a practice uniformly
to all applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified
by business necessity.”55 Lenders could, using entirely legitimate and sound underwriting criteria,
unintentionally create an environment where raising capital and other market pressures would dictate
that a whole class of people be effectively shut out of pursuing advanced education. 56
We are not suggesting that individual private student lenders would engage in intentional or
disparate impact discrimination. Just the opposite: lawsuits are costly and anathema to the profitdriven mission of private lenders. But “business necessity” would dictate that borrowers who do not
meet institutions’ underwriting criteria would be denied.
If large loan balances and poor repayment rates are to be counted as negatives in student loan
underwriting criteria, then many black borrowers would be denied. Even in a regulatory framework
where disparate impact is outlawed, it could be the case that no individual private lender may
be found liable of discrimination, but the cumulative effect of denials across all lenders effectively
permits disparate impact nevertheless.
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Lenders could, using entirely legitimate and sound
underwriting criteria, unintentionally create an
environment where market pressures and capital
would dictate a whole class of people to be
effectively shut out from advanced education.

Lenders could, using entirely legitimate and sound
underwriting criteria, unintentionally create an
environment where raising capital and other market
pressures would dictate that a whole class of people be
effectively shut out of pursuing advanced education.
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5
CONCLUSION
Federal graduate lending provides a critical financing option for all students, regardless of
background or station, who are interested in obtaining an advanced degree. Given that the
fundamental purpose of the Higher Education Act is to expand access to higher education,
the current federal lending programs are clearly aligned with that mission and have helped
to achieve HEA’s goals.
In this report, we have discussed how graduate borrowers are unnecessarily targeted for
programmatic cuts given their high performance as a cohort in the federal loan portfolio;
how there will be no return to a golden era of private student loans; how lending decisions
are made; and as a result of those lending decisions, how black graduate borrowers will
likely be the most negatively impacted by privatization of federal student loans.
Some critics will argue that the negative impacts (denied borrowers and potentially closing
institutions) is a good thing. Advocates say that we should not saddle borrowers with
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debt they cannot afford to attend schools with poor outcomes. That is a perfectly sensible policy
objective. However, the policy solution offered, to retreat entirely from graduate federal lending, is a
blunt instrument that unnecessarily targets students.
The federal government has far more appropriate and effective options and tools (e.g., school
accountability regimes, accreditation reform, etc.) at their disposal that could inject institutional
quality controls into higher education. If the goals are to improve institutional and programmatic
outcomes and potentially lower cost, then policy proposals should be squarely focused on those
goals. Lawmakers should not be enticed by wholesale student loan privatization as an end-run to
student or institutional accountability metrics. Given that HEA reauthorizations are infrequent at best,
America cannot afford to lose an entire generation of students as the result of policy changes that do
not address the stated problem.
Changes to federal graduate lending must not come at the expense of students, especially not
our most critically underserved. Making it more difficult for students to secure financing for their
advanced degrees, thereby reducing access and weakening America’s workforce, would take us
in the wrong direction. Congress must ensure that policy proposals are always grounded in the
fundamental purpose of HEA: expanding access.
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